Know Thy Participant: The Trouble with Nomothetic Assumptions in Moral Psychology
Imagine a world in which researchers measure morality by determining how often people eat peanut butter sandwiches (considered morally good behavior) versus how often they eat jelly sandwiches (considered morally bad behavior). Researchers in this world investigate factors that influence morality by assessing the relationships that exist between situational variables, individual differences, and the eating of peanut butter and jelly sandwiches. Also imagine that in this world there exist reasonable philosophical arguments for why peanut butter sandwich eating is morally good and jelly sandwich eating is morally bad, but there also exist well-worn ethical theories that reject the moral significance of peanut butter and jelly sandwich eating altogether.
Additionally, although a majority of this world's people consider peanut butter sandwich eating to be highly morally good and jelly sandwich eating to be highly morally bad, a sizeable portion of the population also considers peanut butter and jelly sandwich eating morally irrelevant.
Further, a large percentage of people in this world actually hold views that are diametrically opposed to the implicit assumptions of researchers -according to these people, it is morally bad to eat peanut butter sandwiches and it is morally good to eat jelly sandwiches. The field of peanut-butter-and-jelly moral psychology is in crisis.
In this chapter, we argue that researchers in our own world currently study morality and its contributing factors in much the same way as researchers in the moral PB&J world described above. Moral psychologists tend to deem certain patterns of thoughts and behaviors "moral" even though neither scholars nor laypeople agree about the moral significance of these thoughts and behaviors. As a consequence, moral psychologists often investigate the causes and consequences of behaviors that either have little impact on the world or are of little moral interest to scholars and laypeople. We also explain how a small change in how morality is typically assessed could significantly increase the scope and importance of morality research. Finally, we present an empirically-informed list of traits and behaviors that we consider useful proxies of morality.
In this chapter we will focus primarily on the construct of morality; however, most of the concerns we raise and the solutions we offer are relevant to other normative concepts that are likely of interest to readers of this volume, such as prosociality and selfishness. Although we think moral psychologists' current nomothetic bent poses a problem for many areas of psychology (e.g., judgment and decision-making, motivation), here we focus on moral behavior, the area of research where we think this bias is most prevalent and problematic.
Operationalizing "Morality" -An Introduction to the Problem
Traditionally, researchers have taken one of two approaches to operationalizing the concept "morality." Following Frimer and Walker (2008) , we refer to these as the 3 rd -person and 1 st -person approaches. Like in the moral PB&J world, researchers in our world tend to take a 3 rdperson, normative, non-neutral approach to operationalizing the concept of morality, in which what is moral is determined by the researchers, who deem one set of principles or actions morally good and another set morally bad. The principles that researchers use as proxies for morality can be based on normative ethical theory, religious prescriptions, cultural values, lay definitions of morality, or the idiosyncratic predilections of individual researchers. This is called the "3 rd -person" approach because the participant's perspective of what is moral does not influence how the researcher defines morality.
The 3 rd -person approach is widely used in moral psychology. As Frimer and Walker (2008) noted, researchers investigating moral behavior have used bravery (Walker & Frimer, 2007) , extraordinary care (Matsuba & Walker, 2004) , social activism (Colby & Damon, 1992) , honesty (Derryberry & Thoma, 2005) , environmentally friendly behavior (Kaiser & Wilson, 2000) , and community service (Hart, Atkins, & Donnelly, 2006) to operationalize morality. To this list, we add volunteerism (Aquino & Reed, 2002) , honesty (Teper, Inzlicht, & Page-Gould, 2011) , and cooperation (Crockett, Clark, Hauser, & Robbins, 2010) , to name a few.
The traditional alternative to the 3rd-person approach is the1 st -person, value-neutral, descriptive approach (Frimer & Walker, 2008) . In contrast to the 3 rd -person approach, the 1 stperson approach assesses morality according to what the participant herself considers moral. The impartial researcher deems each individual's set of principles or actions moral, and deems failing to follow or enact those principles or actions not moral.
Although no less a figure than Gordon Allport proposed that a 1 st -person approach is the only valid means of assessing moral behavior (Allport, 1937) , and researchers have long warned of the flaws inherent in 3rd-person morality research (e.g., Pittel & Mendelsohn, 1966) , moral behavior has rarely been assessed using the 1st-person approach. Psychologists have occasionally taken participants' idiosyncratic moral beliefs into account when determining which variables to include in their analyses, but have taken this step almost exclusively when studying moral cognition (e.g., Goodwin & Darley, 2008; Wright, 2008; Wright, 2010) , but not when studying moral behavior.
That said, the 1 st -person approach is very similar to the approach taken by advocates of social-cognitive process models of general personality, such as Cognitive Affective Personality System (CAPS; Mischel & Shoda, 1995; and Knowledge-and-Appraisal Personality Architecture (KAPA; Cervone, 2004) . These models were developed largely as a response to calls that behavior was not consistent across situations. The creators and advocates of these models suggested that past research showed that behaviors associated with traits such as agreeableness and conscientiousness were not meaningfully consistent, because participants' perceptions of situations were not taken into account. When researchers assessed behavior across situations that were psychologically similar according to the participants (not just nominally similar to an outsider's perspective), researchers discovered that cross-situational consistency was high (Mischel & Shoda, 1998 Kohlberg, 1970) , that Kohlberg avoided research on moral behavior and instead focused on moral reasoning (Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009) , and it is in part for this same reason that it might be wise for researchers to avoid the 3 rd -person approach to defining morality. The first two types of lay disagreement demand little attention here, as intra-and intercultural variations in moral concerns and judgments have recently received much attention in the psychology literature (for a review, see Graham, Haidt, Koleva, Motyl, Iyer, Wojcik, & Ditto, 2013) . Consequently, we will focus on the discrepancy between the amount of moral relevance that researchers place on behaviors and traits themselves (or assume that their participants place on them) and the moral relevance that their participants actually place on these behaviors and traits (if any at all).
Empirical evidence. To begin to assess this discrepancy, we instructed two groups of participants to rate either the moral importance of a list of traits and behaviors ("How important it is to have each of the following traits in order to be a moral person?") (Table 1) consider morally relevant and should be relatively easy to assess. In both surveys we also included presumably morally neutral traits and behaviors (e.g., eating pickles) that we used as points of comparison.
People rated the moral importance and moral goodness of many of the traits and behaviors on our list as might be expected, but other traits and behaviors -including those that have been used as proxies of morality and prosociality -were rated differently than researchers might expect. For instance, though researchers have often used people's choices in prisoner's dilemma games (PDGs) and public goods games (PGGs) as proxies of moral or prosocial behavior (e.g., Batson & Moran, 1999; Cohen, Montoya, & Insko, 2006; Rand, Greene, & Nowak, 2012 ; Twenge, J. M., Baumeister, R. F., DeWall, C., Ciarocco, N. J., & Bartels, 2007), our findings suggest that laypeople do not consider such cooperation in general to be highly morally relevant or morally good. In fact, participants considered non-cooperation in these games to be almost entirely morally neutral. For instance, non-cooperation in a classic PDG was rated as no more morally bad than eating pickles (on average, both were rated as "This is neither a morally good nor a morally bad behavior"; see Table 2 ). Similarly, participants rated behaviors such as helping an experimenter pick up dropped papers -a behavior that has often been used as a proxy for prosocial behavior (e.g., Isen & Levin, 1972 ) -as only slightly morally good. As a point of comparison, the use of deception in psychology research -something common in experimental moral psychology -tended to be rated as extremely morally bad. Overall, these results suggest that laypersons and researchers disagree about the morality of traits and behaviors. Consequently, the behaviors researchers use as indicators of morality may not be optimal proxies of moral behavior -a potential pitfall that seems to inherently accompany the 3 rd -person approach.
Assessing a different construct. Due to the normative and descriptive disagreement described above, any time a researcher conceptualizes morality in its broadest sense (i.e., in relation to ethics in general), the 3 rd -person approach is likely to result in poor construct validity.
Due to ongoing normative and descriptive moral disagreement, the 3 rd -person approach can only test the extent to which people's behavior is in line with the tenets of one particular set of ethical principles. Thus, this approach may produce information on the degree to which people behave in accord with particular moral principles, but assessing moral behaviors that are in line with only one particular set of moral beliefs does not result in information about morality in general (i.e., "morality" in its most overarching sense), which appears to often be the goal of researchers who investigate moral behavior (e.g., Aquino et al., 2009; Crockett, Clark, Hauser, & Robbins, 2010; Gu, Zhong & Page-Gould, 2013; Jordan, Mullen & Murnighan, 2011; Kouchaki, 2011; Perugini & Leone, 2009; Reynold, Leavitt & DeCelles, 2010; Sachdeva, Iliev & Medin, 2009; Teper, Inzlicht, & Page-Gould, 2011 Recall that the 1 st -person approach operationalizes morality according to whatever each person considers moral (Frimer & Walker, 2008) . Thus, "1 st -person" moral research is immune to the problems with the 3 rd -person approach that were outlined above. That said, an important disadvantage of the 1 st -person approach is its complexity and relative impracticality. This approach requires that researchers accurately assess a person's moral values; unfortunately, social desirability and self-deception are likely to make it extremely difficult for researchers to do so. It is likely that some moral beliefs are more socially desirable than others, and thus it is likely that people will sometimes incorrectly report their moral beliefs in order to optimize appearances. For instance, conservatives participating in a study run by a presumably liberal researcher may not be forthcoming about their true moral beliefs, even if their anonymity is ensured. As for self-deception, research shows that self-enhancement causes people to label a trait as good if they think they possess that trait (Dunning, Perie, and Story, 1991) ; thus, in a study setting people might define what is moral according to how they actually act. As a result, the moral values people list in a 1 st -person study might not necessarily be those which they consider moral, but instead they might simply be descriptions of how they typically act. None of this is to say that 3 rd -person assessments of morality are immune to the effects of social desirability and self-deception; surely 3 rd -person self-report measures of morality are highly susceptible to these biases. However, 1 st -person approaches require two steps that may be influenced by these biases (value assessment and behavior assessment) whereas the 3 rd -person approach is vulnerable to these biases only once (during behavioral assessment). The advantages of the two approaches can be combined by assessing morality using traits and behaviors that prior research suggests people (either in general or in a particular sample) consider highly morally relevant. For instance, a researcher using the mixed approach might assess morality by measuring a person's honesty, because research suggests that people in general consider honesty to be highly morally important (Aquino & Reed, 2002; Smith, Smith & Christopher, 2007 ; see also Tables 1 and 3) . Surprisingly, researchers interested in assessing morality very rarely do this (or if they do, they fail to mention that this logic underlies their choice of moral proxy).
Alternately, a researcher could choose to operationalize morality as, say, bravery because pretests with their particular sample suggest that their participants generally consider bravery to be the most morally important trait. Furthermore, a researcher who is interested in only one particular type of morally relevant behavior (e.g., cheating) may also use the mixed approach; this type of researcher could first determine what type of cheating behavior their participants are likely to consider highly morally bad (but are still relatively likely to perform). All that the mixed approach requires is information on the extent to which participants consider traits and/or behaviors morally good or morally bad.
The results of our recent surveys provide insight into which traits and behaviors researchers can use in order to successfully measure moral behavior and which traits and behaviors are not good candidates for this purpose. Some of these suggestions are underwhelming: as most readers would probably expect, diverse groups of people -liberals and conservatives, men and women, theists and atheists -tend to rate traits such as honesty and fairness as highly morally important (Table 1) . More surprisingly, people in general do not rate traits such as cooperative, helpful, or charitable as highly morally relevant. Researchers should be very cautious when making assumptions about normative concepts such as morality, selfishness, and prosociality.
To reiterate, researchers could choose to measure morality according to that which previous research (such as our own research summarized above) suggests people in general consider highly morally-important, but they could also determine what their own particular participants consider most morally relevant by performing pretests with the particular population or even sample that they will use in their research. As long as a group of participants' (probable) moral beliefs are somehow being taken into account, this approach will likely produce more accurate results than the 3 rd -person research, and at the same time require far less time and effort than a purely 1 st -person approach.
Examples of the mixed approach.
A mixed approach is not the norm in moral psychology, but it has occasionally been used. For example, research on the effect that moral convictions have on behavior tends to involve assessments of each participant's personal moral convictions in regards to the target behavior (Skitka, 2010; Skitka & Baumann, 2008) . And in their investigation of the neural correlates of admiration and moral elevation, Immordino-Yang and colleagues (2009) first determined for each individual participant where the emotional high point of the eliciting stimuli were, aiding their ability to assess moral emotions in the scanner by taking individual variation in the emotional reaction into account.
Given that the mixed approach is a means of assessing moral hypocrisy, it should not be surprising that in the past moral hypocrisy has been assessed by way of the mixed approach. For instance, in order to investigate the situational factors that cause people to act unfairly, ensured they were using an appropriate proxy for unfairness by asking a separate sample of participants whether they considered their behavior of interest -giving oneself a chance to win money rather than giving someone else a chance to win money -to be unfair.
Other examples of the mixed approach in moral psychology go beyond moral hypocrisy.
For instance, prior to performing research designed to test whether various presumed moral behaviors -helping behavior, moral courage, and heroism -are associated with people's moral prototypes, Osswald, Greitemeyer, Fischer, and Frey (2010) first determined whether people actually considered these three behaviors to be distinct moral behaviors. In order to do this, Osswald et al. (2010) simply performed a pretest with participants who were demographically similar to the people who would participate in their main studies. These pretest participants were asked to rate the morality of different scenarios in which helping behavior, moral courage, or heroism were depicted, and by way of this simple pretest it was determined that people indeed considered these behaviors to be distinct moral behaviors.
Had these authors taken a 3 rd -person approach, the results of these studies may have been less valid and their implications would have been less profound (for the reasons described previously), and had either or Osswald et al. (2010) taken a 1 st -person approach their projects would have become much more complicated. Thus, by taking a mixed approach, these authors struck an important balance between methodological rigor and practicality. These extra steps required relatively little effort, but in both cases the extra step taken provided strong support for the assumptions that lay at the foundation of their respective research projects.
Conclusion
Throughout the history of the field of psychology only a handful of researchers have extolled the virtues of a 1 st -person approach to moral research (e.g. Allport, 1937; Blasi, 1990; Colvin & Bagley, 1930) . In contrast, contemporary moral psychologists usually assess moral behavior using a 3 rd -person approach. At this point, however, it should be clear that both approaches have disadvantages. Considering the 3 rd -person approach's potentially negative impact on construct validity and the inherent complexity of effectively assessing morality using the 1 st person approach, one might argue that -as Allport (1937) contended long ago -morality is simply not a topic for psychological inquiry. However, in psychology and perhaps especially in moral psychology, error and inaccuracy will inevitably exist; this does not suggest that an entire field of study should be ignored. Nor does this mean we should settle for research with mediocre validity. Instead, it necessitates that the weaknesses that produce this error are minimized by operationalizing morality in the least problematic way possible.
By asking large groups of laypeople what traits and behaviors they consider moral, immoral, or morally irrelevant, we found evidence of problematic discrepancies between researchers' nomothetic assumptions and participants' views. For instance, measures that many researchers use as proxies for morality (e.g., cooperation or defection in PDG, picking up papers in the lab) are seen as about as morally irrelevant as eating pickles, while the actual behavior of moral psychology researchers (deceiving participants) is seen as highly morally bad. To help address this discrepancy we suggest that researchers use a mixed approach combining the strengths of the 1 st -and 3 rd -person perspectives. This mixed approach still has disadvantages. For instance, even if the mixed approach were used, values will sometimes clash, and it is unclear how a person's morality should be assessed in such cases. However, we believe that even with these disadvantages the mixed approach can help usher in a more interesting and significant era of morality research. Note: 5 = "It is extremely important that a person possesses this characteristic" (in order to be moral), 1 = "It is not important that a person possess this characteristic" (in order to be moral). Sample sizes range from 867 to 905 raters for each item. Keeping the majority of $20 in an ultimatum game. 5.97 1.38
Failing to flip a coin to decide whether to place self or other participant in a "positive consequences" condition (and placing self in positive condition). 5.86 1.37 Showing up late for something. Giving the majority of $20 away in a one shot Dictator Game. 3.61 1.50
Agree to talk to zenophobic inmates on the virtues of immigration 3.21 1.75 (Kayser, Greitemeyer, Fischer & Frey, 2010) Helping an experimenter pick up and organize dropped papers.
3.01 1.32 (van Rompay, Vonk, & Fransen, 2009) Having the opportunity to keep $50 for oneself or keeping $25 and giving $25 to charity, and deciding to give $25 to charity And keeping $25 for oneself.
2.57 1.35
Note: 1 = "This is an extremely morally good behavior/trait;" 5 = "This is neither a morally good nor a morally bad behavior/trait;" 9 = "This is an extremely morally bad behavior/trait." Sample sizes range from 94 to 124 raters for each item. 
